St. John's Law Review
Volume 9
Number 1 Volume 9, December 1934, Number 1

Article 18

Constitutional Law--Statute Forbidding the Payment of
Obligations in Gold Constitutional--Impairment of Contracts by
Congress (Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 265 N.Y. 37
(1934))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
personal injuries be filed within a stated time will generally be held
binding on the passenger although he failed to read them. 5
The plea of infancy may be raised by a minor, but as a condition to the disaffirmance of a contract he will be required to return
the consideration received and restore the other party to the status
quo.' He will also be held to the performance of any conditions or
stipulations contained in the contract if he desires to avail himself of
the benefits of the contract." The fact that he is unable to enter
into a binding contract for things which are not necessaries will not
permit him to disaffirm the contract in part and enforce it in part.8
He must either stand upon his contract or disaffirm it in its entirety.
In the instant case the infant's right to have her baggage transported
arose out of her contract of passage. If she wishes to recover damages for negligence in carrying out a part of the contract, she must
submit to the conditions and limitations surrounding the contract.9
J.F.M.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTE FORBIDDING THE PAYMENT
OF OBLIGATIONS IN GOLD CONSTITUTIONAL-IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS BY CONGRESs.-The plaintiff brought an action to recover

$22.50 in gold coin of the United States of America or its equivalent due on a bond and coupon issued by the defendant company.
- Tewes v. North German Lloyd S. S. Co., 186 N. Y. 151, 78 N. E. 864

(1906); Murray v. Cunard S. S. Co., 235 N. Y. 162, 139 N. E. 226
(1923); cf. The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375, 17 Sup. Ct. 597 (1897)

(notice

to passenger printed on back of ticket and not called to his attention is not
binding upon him); Baer v. North German Lloyd, 69 F. (2d) 88 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934) (printed condition on back of form affixed to ticket relating to claims

for damages for personal injuries held not part of contract and not binding on

passenger because not called to his attention).

'Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578, 55 N. E. 275 (1899).
7O'Laughlin v. Union Central L. Ins. Co., 11 Fed. 280 (C. C. E. D. Mo.

1882); Mead v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 68 Kan. 432, 75 Pac. 475 (1904); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Greer, 115 Tenn. 368, 89 S. W. 327 (1905); WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS (1924) §236.
8A stipulation in a contract permitted a person to attend an educational
institution provided that the student might be dismissed at any time without
any reason being given by the institution. Such a provision is binding on the
student even though she be a minor. She may not sue for specific perform-

ance of the contract to afford her the educational facilities of the institution
and at the same time disaffirm a condition attached to the contract. Anthony

v. Syracuse University, 224 App. Div. 487, 231 N. Y. Supp. 435 (4th Dept.
1928).
'See Evelyn v. International Mercantile Marine
Co., 35 F. (2d) 47 (E. D.
N. Y. 1929), where it was held that an infant who had failed to present her
claim for damages for personal injuries within the time provided in the steamship ticket was prevented from suing the carrier at a later date. Her right to
sue was based on her contract with the company and it must be exercised in
conformity therewith.

RECENT DECISIONS
The said bond contains a clause requiring that both principal and
interest be paid "in gold coin of the United States of America of or
equal to the standard of weight and fineness existing on February 1,
1930." Held, the defense that the defendant by statute ' could not
discharge the principal and interest accruing on such bond and
coupon in any currency other than legal tender of the United States
existing at the time of payment, is valid. Norman v. Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad Co., 265 N. Y. 37, 191 N. E. 726 (1934).
The Congress of the United States has power to regulate and
control the issue and coinage of money and to regulate the value
thereof. 2 The power to enact all laws necessary to the execution of
the primary power is also given Congress.3 The Supreme Court has
held that this section of the Constitution is to be interpreted as meaning a reasonable necessity rather than an absolute necessity. 4 What
constitutes a reasonable necessity is a matter of policy in some instances and in others is a matter of judicial jurisdiction. 5 Those
matters which are political must be decided by Congress itself while6
those which are judicial questions are to be decided by the court.
The matter of regulating the value of money has been held by the
Supreme Court7 to be a political question and therefore not within
its jurisdiction.
There are certain objects of good government which are entrusted to the National Legislature.8 The coinage and evaluation
of money is one of those objects. 9 For the court to undertake to
'31 U. S. C. A. 463 (1933).
2
5.
U. S. CoNsT., Art. I, §8, cl.
'U. S' CoNST., Art. I, §8, cl.18; Brisco v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 12
U. S. 418 (1837); Fox v. Ohio, 11 Pet. 257, 16 U. S. 447 (1846); United
States v. Marigold, 9 How. 560, 18 U. S. 261 (1849) ; Veasie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U. S. 533 (1869); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U. S. 457 (1883); Juillard v.
Greenman, 110 U. S. 421. Contra: Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U. S. 603 (1869).
'"A constitution, * * * is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a
private contract." Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3, at 439; "By the settled
construction and the only reasonable interpretation of this clause, the words
'necessary and proper' are not limited to such measures as are absolutely and
indispensably necessary, without which the powers granted must fail of
execution; * * *." Id. at 440.
'"Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any
of the objects intrusted to the government, to undertake to inquire into the
degree of necessity would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial
department and to tread on legislative ground. This court disclaims all
pretensions to such a power." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S.
698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016 (1892).
7'Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3.

Ibid.

'U. S. CONST., Art. I, §8.
' "The question whether at any particular time, in war or in peace, the
exigency is such, by reason of unusual and pressing demands on the resources
of the government, or of the inadequacy of the supply of gold and silver coin
to furnish the currency needed for the use of the government and of the
people, that it is, as a matter of fact, wise and expedient to resort to this
means, is a political question, to be determined by Congress when the question
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inquire into the degree of necessity for laws and enactments in the
matter would be to overstep the line of distinction between the legislative and judicial departments of our government.'" In view of this
attitude of unwillingness to overstep this- line of demarcation, the
court did not look into the degree of necessity for the legislation
involved."
In the Legal Tender Cases, 12 the court says that Congress has
the power to impair contracts by its legislation. "Every contract
for the payment of money, simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the government over the currency, whatever that
power may be, and the obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed
with reference to that power." 13 The prohibition on the payment
of obligations in gold even when the evidence of debt requires that
it be paid in gold or its equivalent and a direction' to cancel all such
obligations by payment of a dollar for each dollar of indebtedness is
the
within the power of Congress and is therefore a measure within
4
powers conferred by the Constitution of the United States.1
J. A. R., JR.

CORPORATIONS-CUMULATIVE VOTING-PROVISION THEREFOR
IN BY-LAws.-Petitioner, a minority stockholder, seeks confirmance
of election of a director through cumulative voting of his stock
pursuant to a by-law adopted by the corporation with consent of all
the stockholders authorizing that method of voting. Respondents,
majority stockholders, claim that since there is no provision in the
certificate of incorporation providing for cumulative voting, the election is invalid. Held, such provision in by-laws creates a vested right
in the stockholder, and is binding on the other stockholders. Matter
of exigency arises, and not a judicial question to be afterwards passed upon
by the courts." Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3, at 450.
10 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra note 5.
' Legal Tender Cases, supra note 3.
1Ibid.
"Id. at 457.
" Instant case; Rae v. Homestead Loan & Guarantee Co., 176 U. S. 121,
20 Sup. Ct. 341 (1899) ; United States v. Boak Fish Co., 146 Fed. 104 (Cir. Ct.
3rd D. Minn. 1906); Ceballos v. United States, 146 Fed. 380 (C. C. A. 2d,
1906) ; Troy v. Bland, 58 Ala. 197 (1877) ; Belloc v. Davis, 38 Cal. 242 (1869) ;
Jones v. Harker, 37 Ga. 502 (1867) ; Black v. Lusk, 69 Ill. 70 (1873) ; Brown
v. Welch, 26 Ind. 116 (1866); Hintrager v. Bates, 23 Iowa 331 (1867);
George v. Concord, 45 N. H. 434 (1864); Metropolitan Bank v. Van Dyck,
27 N. Y. 400, writ of error dismissed, 68 U. S.512 (1863) ; Schollenberger v.
Brinton, 52 Pa. St. 9 (1866); Johnson v. Ivey, 44 Tenn. 608 (1867). In re
Societ6 Intercommunale Belge d'Electricit6-Feist v. The Company, 49 Times
Law Reports 344. Contra: Hepburn v. Griswold, supra note 3; Meyer v.
Kaufmann, 37 Ga. 600 (1868); Hepburn v. Griswold, 63 Ky. 20 (1865);
Meyer v. Roosevelt, 25 How. Pr. 97 (N. Y. 1862).

